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Abstract 
In this paper we examine the optimal taxation problem in a two sector economy with heterogeneous agents. We show 
that in a steady state of this economy the optimal capital income tax rate can be different from zero. In this economy 
since capital and labour margins are interdependent, any difference in investment goods and consumption goods prices 
allows the government to tax capital income in one sector and undo the tax distortion by differential labour income 
taxation. This policy serves efficiency purpose as it restores the production efficiency condition.
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     1 Introduction.
In this paper we show that in a two sector economy with heterogeneous agents, in a steady state
the optimal capital income tax rate is in general di⁄erent from zero. This result is due to the
interdependence of capital and labour margins in equilibrium. This interdependence allows the
government to choose an optimal policy that taxes/subsidizes capital income from one sector. This
policy is optimal since it restores the production e¢ ciency condition.
Our model is a two sector neoclassical growth model with a government that ￿nances an exoge-
nous stream of purchases. We consider two sectors that produce consumption goods (consumption
sector, hereafter) and investment goods (investment sector, hereafter), using raw labour and capi-
tal on which government levies distorting ￿ at-rate income taxes. We construct the Ramsey (1927)
problem, i.e. the planner￿ s problem of determining the optimal settings over time for two labour
income tax rates and two capital income tax rates. Our study extends the important works of Judd
(1985), Chamley (1986), and Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999), all of which discuss the optimality
of zero capital income tax. Chamley (1986) shows that in a steady state of a one sector economy, the
optimal policy is to set the tax rate on capital income equal to zero. Judd (1985) extends this result
by showing that in a one sector economy with heterogeneous agents, unanticipated redistributive
capital taxation has severely limited e⁄ectiveness since it depresses wages. We consider a model
which is one of the simplest extensions of Chamley (1986) and Judd￿ s (1985) models. We show
that in a steady state of our model, the optimal capital income tax rate in the investment sector is
zero but the optimal capital income tax rate in the consumption sector is in general di⁄erent from
zero.
We show that in a two sector economy where investment and consumption are produced as
two ￿nal goods, capital and labour margins are interdependent, and so is the long run optimal
policy of taxing income from these factors. Due to this interdependence, capital income taxation
in our model can serve the e¢ ciency purpose. We argue that in a steady state since any di⁄erence
in the relative price of investment and consumption is associated with a di⁄erence in the social
marginal values of investment and consumption, a tax/subsidy on capital income in one sector,
leaving the other capital income tax at a zero rate can undo this di⁄erence, which in turns restores
the production e¢ ciency condition. The optimal capital income tax distortions can be undone by
di⁄erential labour income taxation.
The optimality of nonzero capital income tax was primarily hinted in Atkeson et al. (1999),
who use a one sector model with heterogeneous agents. Atkeson et al. (1999) impose additional
restrictions on the optimal taxation problem in order to restrict capital income tax rates and labour
income tax rates to be same across all types of agents. These restrictions are (1) in the Ramsey
equilibrium, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of consumption across all agent types
must be equal, and (2) the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
labour across all types of agents is equal to the ratio of marginal products of labour. Their paper
argues that zero capital income taxation in the steady state is optimal if these extra constraints (in
particular, 2) do not depend on the capital stock, i.e. if the production function is separable between
capital and labour. In this paper we extend their analysis; we show that in a two sector economy the
interdependence of labour and capital margins in equilibrium explains the long run optimal policy
of taxing/subsidizing capital income, and thus it is not necessary to impose additional restrictions
on the production function in order to derive a more general result.
12 A Decentralized Economy with Heterogeneous Agents.
Time is discrete and runs forever. The two production sectors, the consumption sector and the
investment sector, are indexed by j 2 fC;Xg. There is a ￿nite (integer) number of di⁄erent classes
of agents and each class is of measure one. The consumption, labour supply and capital stock of the
representative agent in class i are denoted by ci
t;ni
jt and ki







but the discount factor ￿ 2 (0;1) is same for all agents1. The agents purchase
consumption and investment goods and supply capital and working time to the ￿rms. Firms return
the rented capital stock next period (net of depreciation), pay unit cost of capital, rj, and wages,
wj. Class i agents are each endowed with one unit of time each period and ki
0 > 0 units of capital
at period 0. The resource constraints are:
ct + gt ￿ fc (kct;nct) (1a)
xct + xxt ￿ fx (kxt;nxt) (1b)
xjt = kjt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kjt; j 2 fC;Xg; ￿ 2 (0;1) (1c)
where gt = g > 0 is government consumption, ct is aggregate private consumption, and xj is
new investment goods2.
The government taxes labour income and capital income at rates ￿
j
t per unit and ￿
j
t per unit,
respectively. The government has access to a commitment technology that allows it to commit
itself once and for all to the sequence of tax rates announced at period 0. It makes non-negative
class-speci￿c lump sum transfer TRi
t ￿ 0. The government￿ s social welfare function is a non-




The government￿ s budget constraints are:
gt + TRt = ￿c
twctnct + ￿x
t wxtnxt + ￿c
trctkct + ￿x
t rxtkxt (2)





With competitive pricing, factors are paid their marginal revenue product. Denoting the relative
price of new investment goods as pt, optimality in the production sectors implies rct = fc
k (t);wct =
fc
n (t);rxt = ptfx
k (t); and wxt = ptfx
n (t).
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pt + 1 ￿ ￿
i
. Optimality conditions for agent i include transversality
conditions, (3), and:
ui
nc (t) = ￿ui
c (t)(1 ￿ ￿c
t)wct (4a)
ui
nx (t) = ￿ui
c (t)(1 ￿ ￿x
t )wxt (4b)
ptui
c (t) = ￿ui









c (t) = ￿ui





rxt+1 + pt+1 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(4d)
1The utility function is strictly increasing in consumption, decreasing in labour supply, separable in consumption
and labour, linear in labour and satis￿es standard regularity conditions.
2The technology f
j (:) satis￿es standard regularity conditions (including linear homogeneity).
2- A feasible allocation is a sequence fct;nct;nxt;gt;kct;kxt;xct;xxtg
1
t=0 that satis￿es equation
(1);
- A price system is a 5-tuple of non-negative bounded sequences fwct;wxt;rct;rxt;ptg
1
t=0;







De￿nition 1 (Competitive equilibrium) A competitive equilibrium is a feasible allocation, a
price system, and a government policy, such that (a) given the price system and the government
policy, the allocation solves both sets of the ￿rms￿problems and the agents￿problems, and (b) given
the allocation and the price system, the government policy satis￿es the sequence of government
budget constraints (2).
The competitive equilibrium dynamics can be characterized by a system of equations that
include the transversality conditions, optimality conditions in the production sectors, (1), (2) and
for each class of agent i, (3) and (4).
Notice the interdependence of the capital and labour margins in this two sector economy. From
(4a) and (4b), it is straightforward to show that if the competitive equilibrium has a steady state,
the relative price of new investment goods is determined by p(1 ￿ ￿x)fx
nui
nx = (1 ￿ ￿c)fc
nui
nc.
Furthermore, (4c) and (4d) together imply that in a steady state, p(1 ￿ ￿x)fx
k = (1 ￿ ￿c)fc
k.
These conditions imply that in a steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium the government can only
choose optimal policies that generate allocations which together with the optimal taxes satisfy
(1 ￿ ￿c)(1 ￿ ￿x)fx
kfc
nui
nc = (1 ￿ ￿x)(1 ￿ ￿c)fc
kfx
nui
nx. Thus the capital and labour income taxes
that can implement the competitive equilibrium allocation will depend on each other.
3 The Ramsey Problem.
We use Chamley￿ s (1986) approach to the Ramsey problem and derive the conditions that char-
acterize the Ramsey allocation. Then we look for the taxes that can implement these second-best
wedges. We assume that the government chooses after tax returns to maximize welfare, such
that the chosen after tax returns generate an allocation that is implementable in a competitive
equilibrium. Using the linear homogeneity property of the production functions, we rewrite (2) as:
gt + TRt = fc (kct;nct) + ptfx (kxt;nxt) ￿ e rctkct ￿ e rxtkxt ￿ e wctnct ￿ e wxtnxt (5)













In a model with only one class of agents, given the preset revenue target the Ramsey problem
is the government￿ s problem of choosing the after tax returns that maximize welfare and generate
allocations and prices that satisfy the i invariant equations (5), (4), and (1). Since there are many
classes of agents, the optimal taxes must generate allocations and prices that satisfy equilibrium
conditions for each class of agents. So here the government￿ s problem is one in which the govern-
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+ t [fc (kct;nct) + ptfx (kxt;nxt) ￿ e rctkct ￿ e rxtkxt ￿ e wctnct ￿ e wxtnxt ￿ gt ￿ TRt]
+￿1t [fc (kct;nct) ￿ ct ￿ gt]
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grange multipliers for (5), (1a), (1b&c), (4a), (4b), (4c), (4d) and (3), respectively.
In the Ramsey problem the budget constraint and the ￿rst order conditions of each class of
agents are included; thus the social marginal value of an increment in the capital stock depends
now on whose capital stock is augmented. If in equilibrium all classes behave in the same manner,
their unilateral actions determine the social marginal value of capital3.
We examine the Ramsey equilibrium in the general case for all class i. The Ramsey problem￿ s









k (t + 1) ￿ e rct+1] + ￿1t+1fc
k (t + 1) + ￿2t+1 (1 ￿ ￿)
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nc (t) = e wct
￿
 t ￿ "i
t
￿
￿ ( t + ￿1t)fc
n (t) (7c)
￿iui
nx (t) = e wxt
￿
 t ￿ "i
t
￿
￿ ( tpt + ￿2t)fx
n (t) (7d)
Proposition 1 In a steady state the optimal tax rates are given by:

















n (  + ￿1) ￿ ￿2fx
n]
; (1 ￿ ￿c) =
  + ￿1
￿iui
c + (  ￿ "i)
3Here we assume that tax rates on capital income and tax rates on labour income do not di⁄er across
classes of agents. Atkeson et al. (1999) solve a similar problem for a one sector economy using the primal ap-
proach. If one solves the current problem using the primal approach and invokes such a restriction, in addi-


































ni (t);i 6= ￿. We use Chamley￿ s (1986) approach where these constraints are incorporated with the
detailed equilibrium conditions for all classes of agents.
4Proof. In a steady state, the Ramsey equilibrium allocation is implementable as a competitive






















+ 1 ￿ ￿
￿
(8b)
Since the optimal taxes generate the allocation that satis￿es both (8a) and (8b), the optimal





p + 1 ￿ ￿
￿i
= ￿  (rx ￿ e rx), which together with
(8b) implies:










p +  
￿
6= 0, it must be that in a steady state the optimal taxes satisfy (e rx ￿ rx) = 0,
i.e. ￿x = 0. Similar steps, starting with the time invariant versions of (7a) and (4c) give:
￿2 [1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)] = ￿ [  (rc ￿ e rc) + ￿1rc] (8d)
which, together with 1 = ￿
h
e rc









=   + ￿1 (8e)
In a steady state, the optimal tax policy must be consistent with the equilibrium price of invest-
ment goods, which is given by p(1 ￿ ￿x)fx
nui
nx = (1 ￿ ￿c)fc
nui
nc. Substituting for the equilibrium
price in (8e) we derive
(1 ￿ ￿c) =
(  + ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿c)fc
nui
nx
￿2 (1 ￿ ￿x)fx
nui




The time invariant versions of (7c) and (4a) together, and the time invariant versions of (7d) and























Proposition 2 In a steady state, the optimal capital income tax rate in the consumption sector
is zero if and only if the optimal labour income tax rates are equal across sectors. Otherwise the
optimal capital income tax rate in the consumption sector is not zero.
Proof. From proposition 1, in a steady state optimal labour income taxes satisfy:
1 ￿ ￿x
1 ￿ ￿c =
 












n. The optimal capital income tax rate in the consumption
















5From proposition 2, in a steady state the optimal capital income tax rate in the consumption
sector is nonzero in general, and zero only conditionally. The intuition behind this result can be
drawn from the interdependence of capital and labour margins and the social marginal values of
consumption and investment in this economy. Unlike a one sector model where the ￿nal good
is either consumed or invested in capital, here capital is a good produced in a di⁄erent sector.
This is why equilibrium capital and labour margins are interdependent. It is therefore the initial
allocation of capital across the two sectors that determines the social marginal values of investment
and consumption in a steady state. Due to this interdependence, the equilibrium price of investment
goods depend on the optimal policy of taxing labour income and the equilibrium labour margins. In
addition, from (8f) it is clear that in a steady state the optimal policy of taxing income from capital
and income from labour are also interdependent. Due to this, there exists a unique equilibrium
price of investment goods, or more simply a unique condition explaining the social marginal values
of consumption and investment (i.e. ￿1fc
n = ￿2fx
n), for which zero capital income tax rate in
the consumption sector is optimal. The zero capital income tax policy is therefore one of many
implementable optimal policies, supported by the optimal policy that involves equal labour income
tax rates across sectors. For any other set of allocations, the government can set a tax/subsidy
on capital income from the consumption sector and can use di⁄erential labour income taxation to
undo the tax distortions.
In order to explain to intuition, we simplify the model by assuming ui
nc = ui
nx, i.e. the marginal






p + 1 ￿ ￿
￿i
= ￿  (rx ￿ e rx) as
￿2 = ￿ [  (rx ￿ e rx) + ￿2 (fx
k + 1 ￿ ￿)] (10a)
which assists us in identifying the social marginal value of capital. Equation (10a) states that
a marginal increment of capital in the investment sector increases the quantity of capital by the
amount (fx
k + 1 ￿ ￿), which has social marginal value equal to ￿2. In addition, there is an increase
in tax revenues equal to (rx ￿ e rx), which enables the government to reduce other taxes by the same
amount. Since   is the shadow price of the government￿ s resources, the reduction of this excess
burden equals   (rx ￿ e rx). The sum of the two e⁄ects is discounted by ￿, and is equal to the social
marginal value of capital in the investment sector, given by ￿2. Since the optimal policy is to set
￿x = 0, investment in the investment sector is consistent with the condition 1 = ￿ (fx
k + 1 ￿ ￿),
which characterizes the socially optimal allocation of capital in the investment sector.
Now notice that in a steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium, in (8e), ￿1 =
￿2
p , ￿c = 0. This
implies that a zero capital income tax rate in the consumption sector is optimal if and only if
p =
￿2
￿1, i.e. ￿c = 0 is optimal if and only if the relative price of investment goods is equal to the
ratio of the social marginal value of investment to the social marginal value of consumption. We
rewrite (8d) as:
￿2 = ￿ [  (rc ￿ e rc) + ￿1fc
k + ￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)] (10b)
If in a steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium, p =
￿2
￿1 and the government taxes capital income








k + 1 ￿ ￿
￿
(10c)
The zero capital income tax policy (for the consumption sector) is optimal only if the resulting
allocations replicate the socially optimal allocation of capital in the consumption sector, for which
61 = ￿ (fc
k + 1 ￿ ￿) must hold. Together with (10c) this implies that in a steady state if the optimal
policy involves ￿c = 0, it should generate an allocation that is consistent with
￿1
￿2 = 1, i.e. an
allocation consistent with p = 1.
We now explain the converse, i.e. if in a steady state the price of investment goods and the
price of consumption goods are equal, the optimal policy is to set ￿c = 0. Say in a steady state
p = 1. From (8e),
(1 ￿ ￿c)(￿2 +  ) = (  + ￿1) (10d)
This now de￿nes the steady state optimal capital income tax policy for the consumption sector.
This policy must satisfy:
1 = ￿
￿￿
  + ￿1
  + ￿2
￿
fc










  + ￿1
  + ￿2
￿￿
+ ￿1fc
k + ￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(10f)
Equations (10e) and (10f) together imply that the steady state optimal policy implements the
socially optimal level of capital if it is consistent with the condition (  + ￿1) = (  + ￿2). The only
optimal policy that satis￿es this condition is to set ￿c = 0.
If the price of investment goods and the price of consumption goods are not equal, the govern-
ment can implement the optimal policy that taxes/subsidizes capital income in the consumption
sector and taxes labour income from the two sectors at di⁄erent rates. With ui
nc = ui
nx, the com-
petitive equilibrium condition (1 ￿ ￿c)(1 ￿ ￿x)fx
kfc
n = (1 ￿ ￿x)(1 ￿ ￿c)fc
kfx
n is consistent with the
production e¢ ciency condition if (1 ￿ ￿c)(1 ￿ ￿x) = (1 ￿ ￿x)(1 ￿ ￿c). If there is no di⁄erence in
the relative price of the two goods, the policy that satis￿es the production e¢ ciency condition must
involve ￿c = 0, ￿c = ￿x. This policy is one of many implementable Ramsey policies, and it is the
optimal policy only if p = 1. This recovers the Chamley-Judd result in our setting. For all other
cases, the optimal policy involves (1 ￿ ￿c)(1 ￿ ￿x) = (1 ￿ ￿c) with ￿c 6= ￿x and ￿x = 0.
Let us consider an example. Say the economy is in a steady state with an ine¢ ciently large
production of consumption goods and low production of investment goods, such that investment
goods are more expensive than consumption goods. The long run optimal policy (starting from
that particular steady state) should encourage production of investment goods by setting a tax
on capital income and a higher tax on labour income from the consumption sector. This policy,
supported by a zero capital income tax rate and a lower labour income tax rate in the investment
sector, encourages agents to shift more capital and working hours to the investment sector, which
in turns increases the production of investment goods and minimizes the relative price di⁄erence.
This also restores production e¢ ciency.
The Ramsey equilibrium conditions also explain how the distortions of a capital income tax can
be undone. Consider (10b), which states that a marginal increment of capital in the consumption
sector increases the quantity of consumption goods by the amount fc
k, which has social marginal
value ￿1. This increment is adjusted by capital depreciation in the investment sector, which has
social marginal value ￿2. The aggregate increment in the quantity of available consumption goods
in social marginal value terms is equal to [￿1fc
k + ￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)]. The ￿rst term is due to an increase
in capital in the consumption sector, while the second terms stands for an indirect increase in
production of consumption goods through an increase in depreciated capital in the investment
7sector. This is obvious since in a steady state, with zero capital income tax in the investment
sector it is best to keep depreciated capital in the investment sector. The increased tax revenue,
equal to (rc ￿ e rc), enables the government to reduce other taxes by the same amount, and the
reduction of this excess burden equals   (rc ￿ e rc). The sum of these e⁄ects is discounted, and is
equal to the social marginal value of the available capital.
It is therefore optimal to set zero tax rate on capital income from the consumption sector when
the social marginal value of investment and the social marginal value of consumption are same,
implying in turns that their relative prices are same. Any di⁄erence in the social marginal value of
these two is re￿ ected in a relative price di⁄erence, which can be undone by the optimal policy that
involves a tax/subsidy to capital income in the consumption sector and di⁄erential labour income
tax rates.
4 Conclusion.
We examine optimal income taxation in a two sector economy with heterogeneous agents. We
contribute by showing that in a steady state of this economy, the optimal capital income tax rate
in the consumption sector is in general di⁄erent from zero. Our analysis shows that any di⁄erence in
the social marginal value of investment and the social marginal value of consumption is re￿ ected in
the relative price di⁄erence between the same, and such a di⁄erence creates an opportunity for the
government to choose the optimal policy that has zero tax on capital income from the investment
sector, a tax/subsidy on capital income from the consumption sector, and di⁄erent rates of labour
income taxes across sectors.
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